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The Spirit of Contradiction in the
Buddhist Doctrine of Not-Self*
Hugh Nicholson /

Loyola University Chicago

In his comprehensive and authoritative study of the doctrine of “notself ” (Pāli anattā; Sanskrit anātman) in Theravāda Buddhism, Selfless
Persons (1982), Steven Collins identifies two distinct functions of this
doctrine. He correlates these functions, moreover, to a sociological distinction between the religious specialist and the ordinary Buddhist.
Thus, in the context of the practice of the analytical “insight” meditation
practiced by members of the former group, the anattā doctrine refers
to “the classification of any experience or concept into a known, nonvalued, impersonal category.”1 Such classification or redescription of
experience serves as an effective technique for cultivating an attitude
of disinterest toward the object thus classified, thus negating the desire
that, according to the Buddha’s Second Noble Truth, is the root cause
of suffering.2 For the vast majority of Buddhists, however, who do not
practice such meditation, the doctrine’s main function was to provide
“an intransigent symbolic opposition to Brahmanical thought.”3 Because
Collins associates this latter, oppositional dimension of the anattā doctrine with those Buddhists lacking in specialized knowledge of the doctrine or a commitment to the corresponding regimens of meditative
practice, one might be tempted to infer that this political-ideological
function of anattā appears only in default of the former, as a kind of
* I presented several of the ideas contained in this article in a talk I gave at the Center for
the Study of World Religions at Harvard Divinity School on February 16, 2011; I have benefited
greatly from the feedback I received in the discussion that followed. I am grateful to the
three anonymous reviewers of this article for their constructive criticism and suggestions.
1
Steven Collins, Selfless Persons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 173. Hereafter, Sanskrit will be abbreviated as “Skt.” and Pāli as “Pā.”
2
Ibid., 173, 113.
3
Ibid., 77, see also 12. Richard Gombrich (Buddhist Precept and Practice [Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1991], 86) observes that most of those Buddhists he encountered in Śri Lanka
assented to the doctrine without being able to articulate it.
䉷 2012 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0022-4189/2012/9201-0002$10.00
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degenerative form thereof.4 He notes, no doubt correctly, that the specialized understanding and application of the anattā doctrine have
played no significant role in the religious lives of the vast majority of
Buddhists.5 What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which the
inverse relation holds true, that is, what role, if any, the oppositional
aspect of the doctrine has played in the religious formation of those
Buddhists who undertake the spiritual exercises informed by the specialized understanding of the anattā doctrine.
In this article I would like to reflect on this relation between what
might be called the political-oppositional and the spiritual-transformative dimensions of the anattā doctrine. In explicating each of these
dimensions of the doctrine I will be drawing from the excellent work
that has been done by scholars such as Collins, Richard Gombrich, and
Johannes Bronkhorst, among others. With respect to the politicaloppositional dimension of anattā, I will be foregrounding a theme that
is largely secondary in those works. What I hope to add substantively to
the discussion, however, is the suggestion that the oppositional aspect
of the anattā doctrine is linked, albeit indirectly, to the meditative program of cultivating attachment.
In this task of relating the political and the spiritual aspects of anattā
I find it helpful to understand this central Buddhist teaching as a theological doctrine rather than as a philosophical inference or an immediate datum of religious experience.6 For, as I shall argue presently, the
category of theological doctrine, understood as communally authoritative discourse that sustains the identity of a religious community, foregrounds both the oppositional aspect of authoritative religious discourse
4
Although Collins speaks of these two uses of anattā doctrine as alternatives—for the
ordinary Buddhist, the anattā doctrine functions symbolically and ideologically, whereas for
the Buddhist specialist it is taken literally and personally (Selfless Persons, 12)—I suspect he
would be uncomfortable with this inference.
5
Collins, Selfless Persons, 94, 68; cf. Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 84–89.
6
I should distinguish the approach taken here from that of the proponents of “Buddhist
theology” (a movement with which, I might add, I happen to be quite sympathetic). To
propose theological doctrine as a useful heuristic category of analysis is obviously not the
same thing as arguing for the appropriateness and legitimacy of engaging religious-normative
concerns in the academic study of Buddhism. For the latter argument, see, e.g., John Makransky, “Editor’s Introduction,” pt. 2, “Contemporary Academic Buddhist Theology: Its Emergence and Rationale,” in Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars,
ed. Roger L. Jackson and John J. Makransky (New York: Routledge, 2000), 14–19; Rita M.
Gross, “Buddhist Theology?” in Jackson and Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 53–60; Malcolm
David Eckel, “The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion,”
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62, no. 4 (Winter, 1994): 1085–1110. Here I adopt
a more standard academic approach that aims at more or less neutral description.
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and the role of such discourse in religious formation.7 It is thus able to
reveal a dimension of the anattā doctrine that is often hidden when one
follows the more usual procedure of regarding this doctrine as a philosophical proposition and/or as a phenomenological description of
religious experience.8

anattā as theological doctrine
Most modern interpreters of classical Indian thought who have sought
to engage Indian intellectual traditions beyond the historical and philological analysis of texts have viewed these texts through the lens of the
concept of philosophy. Their use of the category of philosophy, by focusing attention on the arguments that Buddhists, Brahmins, and Jains
have used to explain and defend the teachings of their respective
traditions, has successfully overcome a pervasive failure, stemming from
age-old orientalist tendencies to view Indian thought as “mystical,” intuitive, and otherworldly and to acknowledge the intellectual rigor of
classical Indian thought in general and Buddhist thought in particular.9
More recently, the category of philosophy has been broadened to encompass the transformative-spiritual dimension of Buddhist, Hindu, and
7

Here my use of the term “theology” obviously extends beyond its etymological sense, in
which case it would be valid only for theistic traditions. Rather, I follow José Cabezón (“Buddhist Theology in the Academy,” in Jackson and Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 25) in understanding “theology” more broadly as “a form of normative discourse, self-avowedly rooted in
tradition, with certain formal properties.”
8
Having announced a preference for one comparative category with respect to a specific
area of interest, let me quickly add, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, that I do not
claim that the category of theological doctrine is superior in any absolute sense to any of the
alternatives for understanding the doctrine of not-self. If the use of comparative categories
in understanding other cultures is unavoidable (see, e.g., Charles Taylor, “Comparison, History, Truth,” in Myth and Philosophy, ed. Frank Reynolds and David Tracy [Albany: SUNY Press,
1990], 41), as I believe it is, there nevertheless remains a degree of flexibility in the specific
choice of categories the scholar can use. The use of a given comparative category is justified
to the extent that it sheds light on the phenomenon studied; its value is determined by its
heuristic power with respect to a specific question or concern. Comparative categories function
like metaphors in that different categories foreground different aspects of reality. On the
latter point, see Fitz John Porter Poole, “Metaphors and Maps: Towards Comparison in the
Anthropology of Religion,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 54, no. 3 (Autumn 1986):
414–15, 420. The choice of category therefore is largely dictated by the scholar’s theoretical
interests. See Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990),
53.
9
An exemplary recent example of this approach is Parimal G. Patil, Against a Hindu God
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), esp. 9–10, 16; other notable studies of Buddhism
from a philosophical point of view are Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2005), 7–9, 205; Matthew T. Kapstein, Reason’s Traces (Boston:
Wisdom Publications, 2001); Claus Oetke, “Ich” und das Ich (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988).
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Jain teachings. Inspired by the seminal work of Pierre Hadot in Hellenistic philosophy, scholars like Matthew Kapstein, Dan Arnold, and
Francis Clooney have given closer consideration to the broader context
of philosophical claims and arguments in various techniques of selfcultivation.10 Even with this shift from what Kapstein calls a “problems
and arguments approach” in the study of philosophy to the broader
conception of philosophy as spiritual exercise, however, the category of
philosophy is ill equipped to handle that other element in the problematic that concerns us, namely, the polemical and ideological dimension of the anattā doctrine. Philosophical approaches to the study of
the history of Buddhist thought, while duly acknowledging the sectarian
and polemical character of many classical Buddhist texts, tend to downplay the significance of the polemical aspects of those texts in their
effort to explicate their philosophical meaning. A particularly revealing
passage in this regard can be found in the introduction of Kapstein’s
Reason’s Traces. Referring to those sections of Śāntaraks ita’s Tattvasaṅgraha that are devoted to a refutation of Sām
 khya doctrine, Kapstein
asks, “Now, how does the study of this and its refutation properly belong
to the program of self-culture through spiritual exercise that we have
been discussing? For on the surface, at least, it appears that Śāntaraks ita’s purpose is primarily to dismiss the teachings of Buddhism’s
opponents and to defend the faith; philosophical argument, so it seems,
is deployed here primarily in the service of doctrinal apologetics.”11
While recognizing the legitimacy of this line of interpretation, Kapstein
feels compelled to offer “an alternative reading,” namely, that the rival
doctrines Śāntaraks ita refutes represent deficient modes of self-understanding such that doctrinal apologetics ultimately functions as a kind
of therapeutic exercise. Now, while I must confess to finding this alternative interpretation quite compelling, I would question the assumption
that appears to motivate it, namely, that doctrinal apologetics has little
to do with “the program of self culture through spiritual exercise.” I
suspect that Kapstein’s approach to the polemical aspects of Śāntaraks ita’s text betrays a normative conception of philosophy that regards
the elements of partisanship found in the history of philosophy as for10
Kapstein, Reason’s Traces, 7–8; cf. Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief, 212–13; Francis
X. Clooney, Beyond Compare (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 79–82.
Paul Griffiths’s conception of scholastic reading also emphasizes the transformative dimension
of doctrine and argument. See his “Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual
Practice,” in Scholasticism, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 214, 217.
11
Kapstein, Reason’s Traces, 15.
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eign to its spirit or essence.12 The following statement of Gilbert Ryle,
which would pertain to much of classical Indian philosophy, is a paradigmatic expression of this attitude:13 “The alleged party issues are never
the important philosophic questions, and to be affiliated to a recognizable party is to be the slave of nonphilosophic prejudice in favour
of a (usually nonphilosophic) article of belief. To be a ‘so-and-so-ist’ is
to be philosophically frail. And while I am ready to confess or to be
accused of such a frailty, I ought no more to boast of it than to boast
of astigmatism or mal de mer.”14 Put differently, philosophy, certainly in
its modern, “antischolastic” forms, is constitutively opposed to what the
sociologist Lewis Coser, following Georg Simmel, terms “non-realistic
conflict,” that is, conflict that is not reducible to the specific issue of
disagreement but rather is motivated by a formal impulse to differentiate
one group from another.15 A philosopher like Ryle does not object to
polemic in philosophy so long as the polemic derives from material
disagreement, in other words, that it is “realistic,” in Coser’s sense. What
he objects to, rather, is ideological commitment as the basis and motive
for philosophical disagreement.16 As I shall argue below, this a priori
“spirit of contradiction” (Simmel) is an undeniable feature of the historical development of the doctrine of not-self.
Thus, while scholars of Buddhism have recently expanded the concept
of “Buddhist philosophy” to include Hadot’s notion of “spiritual exercise,” a normative self-understanding of philosophy interferes with an
acknowledgment of the role of social opposition in the processes of
12
If the category of philosophy is understood broadly to include scholasticism, then it can
recognize the apologetic and ideological elements of philosophical argumentation. See Cabezón, “Introduction,” in Scholasticism, 4–5. But it is precisely the scholastic element of traditional philosophy that tends to be regarded unfavorably by modern philosophy. See Cabezón, “Introduction,” 2–3; Griffiths, “Scholasticism,” 201.
13
Incidentally, I suspect that this partisan or scholastic feature of classical Indian thought,
more than a still pervasive failure to acknowledge the intellectual rigor of Indian philosophy
or the more sophisticated hermeneutical claim that the Wirkungsgeschichte of classical Indian
thought does not extend to the intellectual traditions of the West (see, e.g., Patil, Against a
Hindu God, 6; Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan [Boston: Beacon,
1967], 22–23) is responsible for the fact that relatively few Western philosophers have been
persuaded to give Indian philosophy the serious consideration it deserves.
14
Gilbert Ryle, “Taking Sides in Philosophy,” in Collected Papers, vol. 2 (New York: Barnes
& Noble, 1971), 153–54.
15
Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956), 48–55; cf.
Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations, trans. Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard
Bendix (New York: Free Press, 1955), 28–30.
16
Ryle, “Taking Sides,” 156. The distinction between realistic and nonrealistic conflict in
the context of intellectual discussion roughly corresponds to the distinction early Nyāya made
between vāda, a discourse motivated by a quest for truth, and jalpa, a discussion motivated
by a quest for victory.
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religious formation. By contrast, the category of specifically theological
doctrine, here defined, adapting a formulation of George Lindbeck, as
“communally authoritative teaching considered essential to the identity
of the community in question,” foregrounds both these aspects of Buddhist teaching.17 To that extent, it is better suited to explore the relation
between the spiritual-transformative and the oppositional-ideological
dimensions of the anattā doctrine.
That theological doctrine plays a role in shaping the way human beings experience and understand the world has been widely acknowledged in the scholarly literature on the subject at least since Lindbeck’s
influential book The Nature of Doctrine (1984). Clearly distinguishing his
position from both the traditionalist, “cognitive-propositional” understanding of doctrines as informative truth claims about objective realities
and the liberal, “experiential-expressive” theory of doctrines as expressions or symbolizations of inner religious experiences, Lindbeck argues
that doctrines function primarily as authoritative rules of communal
discourse and action.18 Drawing on the work of Clifford Geertz, Lindbeck emphasizes the role of doctrine, in concert with other outward
features of religious life such as ritual and sacrament, in shaping individual and communal experience.
Theorists of doctrine, particularly those who approach the subject
from a standpoint of theological commitment, have been somewhat
more reluctant to recognize the centrality of the second aspect of theological doctrine that I wish to highlight, namely, its political role in
mobilizing religious communities against their proximate rivals.19 And
yet, I would argue that this political-oppositional function of doctrine
follows logically from the regulative function highlighted by Lindbeck.
Inasmuch as a religious community with a clear sense of identity is not
simply a given but is rather something actively constructed and maintained through ongoing acts of differentiation and mobilization, the
regulative function of doctrine presupposes the “political” mobilization
17
Lindbeck’s actual formulation is the following: “Church doctrines are communally authoritative teachings regarding beliefs and practices that are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the group in question” (George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984], 74).
18
Ibid., 79–84, 104–8.
19
For example, Paul Griffiths, while recognizing the use of doctrine to demarcate religious
communities as a legitimate use thereof, nevertheless classifies this as a “nondoctrinal” use
of doctrine (On Being Buddha [Albany: SUNY Press, 1994], 21). The boundary marking function of doctrine is extrinsic to the two primary, “properly doctrinal” uses he recognizes, namely,
to describe the nature of things and to recommend forms of action and attitude to those
standing in the sphere of a given doctrine’s authority (21–23). Griffiths’s classification of the
boundary marking function of doctrine as extrinsic to its properly doctrinal use reflects his
unapologetically formalist approach to doctrine (2–3, 29).
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of community.20 The community whose speech and behavior are to
be regulated must first be set off from others through various discursive—of which one is doctrine—and nondiscursive means.21 Thus understood, the category of theological doctrine unites the two dimensions
of the anattā doctrine mentioned above: doctrines play a part in shaping
religious experience, and they mobilize communal identity through
differentiation.
the emergence of anattā as a mark of buddhist identity
It is clear that the not-self doctrine was a response to the concept of
the ātman in contemporary Brahmanical thought. Eventually the anattā
doctrine became a touchstone for Buddhist identity.22 Certainly by the
time we get to Vasubandhu (early fifth century CE), the denial of a self
or ātman—understood as a reality transcending the physical and psychic
constituents (Pā. khandha, Skt. skandha) of the human organism—had
become, at least for certain Buddhist schools, a sine qua non for liberation.23 It should be noted that the ātman that Buddhism originally
rejected does not coincide with the absolute, abstract, and impersonal
conception of the ātman in Advaita (Nondualist) Vedānta that is perhaps
20
See the critique of this aspect of Lindbeck’s postliberal theology in Kathryn Tanner,
Theories of Culture (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 104–19.
21
Lindbeck himself highlights two features of doctrine that point directly to this underlying
political-ideological dimension of doctrine. First, he observes that “doctrines must be understood in terms of what they oppose” (Nature of Doctrine, 75). It is relatively clear, for example,
that although the Nicene doctrine of the Son as homoousios with the Father is notoriously
ambiguous as an affirmation, it is easy to specify what it denied, namely, a subordination of
the Word of God to God. Second, “the official doctrines of a community may poorly reflect
its most important and abiding orientations or beliefs” (75). It is this second feature of
doctrine, more than any other, that manifests an a priori impulse to distinguish one’s community from others. The infamous iota that separated the Nicene homoousion from the antiNicene homoiousion in the later fourth-century Trinitarian controversies is a paradigmatic
example of this. See Simmel, Conflict and the Web, 30; cf. Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 76.
22
Here I use the term “identity” to refer simply and rather blandly to the consciousness of
Buddhism as a distinctive body of teaching and tradition. I certainly do not intend the term
to imply a reference to a bounded and homogeneous social group as it does in modern
nationalist ideologies. Pace Richard Handler (“Is ‘Identity’ a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?”
in Commemorations, ed. John R. Gillis [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994], 27–
40), I believe that the use of the term is compatible with a recognition that the symbolic
boundaries that demarcate social groups are continually constructed and reconstructed in
relation to their surroundings.
23
Or, more accurately, a belief in such a self renders liberation impossible inasmuch as it
serves as the fundamental instance of attachment. See Swāmı̄ Dwārikādās Shāstrı̄, ed., Abhidharmakośa & Bhāsya of Ācharya Vasubandhu with Sphutārthā Commentary of Ācharya Yaśomitra,
pt. 4 (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1973), 1189, lines 1–4: “kim
 khalvato ‘nyatra mokso nāsti?
nāsti. kim
 kāran am? vitathātmadr stinivistatvāt” (translated as “Now, then, is no liberation [from
the round of sam
 sāra] to be found outside of this [teaching of the Buddha]? No, it is not.
Why so? Owing to preoccupation with false views of self” in Kapstein, Reason’s Traces, 350).
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more familiar to students of Indian religion.24 Unlike this Advaitic ātman,
which, according to André Bareau, postdates the advent of Buddhism
by at least five hundred years,25 the ātman familiar to the early Buddhist
texts is an individualized, personal principle. We could perhaps say that
this conception of the ātman, which is found in the earliest Upanis ads,
is more proto-Sām
 khya than proto-Vedānta.26
The emergence of the anattā doctrine in the early, formative period
of Buddhism can be understood in the context of the movement’s oppositional stance toward the Brahmanical order more generally.27 Examples of such a stance, conveyed through striking and at times humorous images, can be found throughout the Pāli canon.28 For example,
24
André Bareau, “La notion de personne dans le bouddhisme indien,” in Problèmes de la
personne, ed. Ignace Meyerson (Paris: Mouton, 1973), 96; David Seyfort Ruegg, Buddha-Nature,
Mind, and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective (London: University of London,
1989), 20.
25
Bareau, “La notion de personne,” 96. Buddhist thinkers do not mention a specifically
Vedāntic conception of the ātman only until rather late. The earliest mention of Vedānta
seems to be Bhavaviveka; the earliest mention of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta in particular is
Kamalaśı̄la. See Ruegg, Buddha-Nature, 21, no. 6; see also Kapstein, Reason’s Traces, 113.
26
Significantly, there is no mention of the neuter, absolute brahman in the Pāli suttas. See
E. J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, 2nd ed. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1951), 87,
96. According to Hermann Oldenberg (Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfang des Buddhismus
[Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1915], 295), the mention of an eternal self standing
over against an eternal world like an immovable mountain peak (“yathā sassato attā ca loko
ca vañjho kūtattho esikatthāyitthito”) in the Brahmajāla Sutta contains an unmistakable reference to the Sām
 khya doctrine of a duality between eternal spirit and nature (purusa and
prakrti, respectively). And yet this same author qualifies the Sām
 khya influence on early
Buddhism by denying an “immediate dependence” (unmittelbare Abhängigkeit) of the latter on
the former (294). We must not uncritically read later Vedāntic conceptions into the early
Upanisads. As Hajime Nakamura (A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, pt. 1, trans. Trevor
Leggett, Segakul Mayeda, and Taitetz Unno [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983], 429, cf. 105)
observes, the Upanisads do not unambiguously teach ātman/brahman as the only absolute;
this interpretation of ātman/brahman as the chief purport of the Upanisadic corpus is the
achievement of the later Vedāntic school, starting with Bādarāyan a’s Brahma-Sūtra (fifth century CE).
27
When I speak here of the formative period of Buddhism or, alternatively, “early Buddhism,” I refer to the period between the time of the Buddha (late sixth or fifth century
BCE, depending on chronology) and the reign of the Mauryan king Aśoka (270–232 BCE;
see Steven Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998], 53–54). This period corresponds to what Frank E. Reynolds and Charles Hallisey
(“Buddhism,” in The Encyclopedia of Religions, ed. Mircea Eliade [New York: Macmillan, 1987],
337–38) term “sectarian Buddhism,” where the adjective refers not to the proliferation of
Buddhist sects (which appears later even if it had roots in the earliest period) but rather to
“a certain distance, both self-perceived and real, from other religious communities, as well
as from the society, civilization, and culture with which it coexisted” (337). With Aśoka’s
patronage of Buddhism in the third century BCE, Buddhism’s sectarian phase gave way to a
period in which Buddhism became what Reynolds and Hallisey term a “civilizational religion.”
28
The Pāli Canon, the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas in particular, remains one of the earliest
and certainly the most extensive and accessible sources for Buddhism’s formative period. I
am keenly aware that, as Jason Neelis (Early Buddhist Transmission and Trade Networks [Leiden:
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the Brahmajāla Sutta depicts a vain and somewhat ridiculous Brahma
falsely imputing causal efficacy to his earlier wish for companionship
when other transmigrating beings, their merit exhausted and falling
from the world of radiance (ābhassarakāya), join him in this world.29 In
a similar vein, the Tevijja Sutta, in a famous image, compares the Vedic
tradition with its claims of transcendent authority to a string of blind
men, each following the one immediately before and all ultimately following a leader who is equally blind.30 In seeking to invert the norms
of a hegemonic Brahmanical order, however, early Buddhism generally
employed a more oblique strategy.31 More often than not, Buddhism
chose to redefine, rather than reject outright, key Brahmanical terms
and concepts, such as brāhman a, dharma, ārya (noble; a member of one
of the “twice-born” varn as), and karma.32 Thus the Buddha teaches that
the true brāhman a is not defined by his birth or his mastery of Vedic
lore but rather by his moral virtue (sı̄la).33 The Pāli term sutta, probably
deriving from Sanskrit sūkta, the sacred hymns of the Veda (rather than
Brill, 2011], 42) puts it, “Pāli texts do not necessarily represent the oldest or relatively ‘pure’
versions of the Buddha’s teachings,” as confirmed by the relatively recent discovery of Gāndhārı̄ manuscripts that predate the earliest extant Pāli manuscripts (42–44; Gregory Schopen,
“Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhsim” in Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks
[Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997], 25; Richard Gombrich, What the Buddha Thought
[London: Equinox, 2009], 98). According to the Pāli tradition itself, the Canon—or perhaps
a rudimentary version thereof (Schopen, “Two Problems,” 23–24)—was first written down at
the end of the first century BCE, and while there is no reason to doubt that, as Collins
(Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, 54) notes, “many of the texts later redacted in writing
do afford us reliable knowledge of pre-Aśokan texts,” our knowledge of this period is unavoidably conjectural and sketchy.
29
T. W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter, eds. The Dı̄gha Nikāya, vol. 1. (London: Pali
Text Society, 1890), 17–18; F. Max Müller, ed. Sacred Books of the Buddhists, vol. 2. (London:
Pali Text Society, 1973), 30–32. This passage probably alludes to the creation myth in
Br hadāran yaka Upanisad 1.4.
30
Müller, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 305.
31
In characterizing Brahmanical thought as hegemonic with respect to the larger culture
of ancient India, I do not want to suggest that there was broad agreement among brahmins
on the usage of the relevant terms and concepts. Even in the Vedic-Upanisadic era, that is,
before the development of the classical schools of Brahmanical thought (Sām
 khya, Vaiśesika,
Mı̄mām
 sā, etc.), there was rivalry among the various Vedic schools of recitation (śākhā). Thus
the Upanisads, which represent a variety of śākhā affiliations, contain significant differences
in the interpretation of key terms such as ātman, brahman, and karma. The issue of śākhā
affiliation and rivalry is a central theme in Signe Cohen’s Text and Authority in the Older
Upanisads (Leiden: Brill, 2008), esp. 1, 6, 10–13.
32
On the Buddhist response to the Brahmanical order as an example of “normative inversion,” see Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2006), 51–53. The term “normative inversion” comes from Jan Assmann,
Moses the Egyptian (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
33
See, e.g., the Son adan d a Sutta (Müller, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 152–57); cf. K. R.
Norman, “Theravāda Buddhism and Brahmanical Hinduism: Brahmanical Terms in a Buddhist Guise,” in The Buddhist Forum, vol. 2, ed. Tadeusz Skorupski (New Delhi: Heritage, 1992),
196.
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sūtra), now refers to the Buddha’s discourses—precisely the same discourses that, ironically, disparage Vedic learning.34 And most significantly perhaps, karma no longer refers primarily to sacrificial action but
rather to the intention of action in general.35 In these examples, with
the possible exception of the last, one might say, using the terminology
of the philosopher C. L. Stevenson, that the emotive, laudatory meaning
of the Brahmanical term is held constant, while its descriptive meaning
is significantly altered—sometimes radically—in accordance with the
often diametrically opposed interests and values of Buddhism.36 Frequently the term subject to radical redefinition acquires a profoundly
ironic sense: the example of sutta/sukta mentioned above would be one;
the use of the term originally referring to Vedic sacrifice, dharma (Pā.
dhamma), to refer to the Buddha’s teaching—one of whose salient features was a rejection of Vedic sacrifice—would be another.37 Such an
oblique response is typical of movements forced to assert themselves in
the idiom of a culturally dominant adversary.38 In other words, to adopt
Michel de Certeau’s felicitous military metaphor, it is an example of
the “tactics” employed by a strategically disadvantaged party that “must
play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of
a foreign power.”39 By being tactically redefined in this way, certain key
Brahmanical terms are transformed into metaphors. Thus brāhman a becomes a metaphor for the virtuous person; ariya/ārya a metaphor for
34

Pollock, Language of the Gods, 52.
Richard Gombrich, How Buddhism Began (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone, 1996), 51–54,
and Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo (New York:
Routledge, 1988), 66–69. Gombrich (How Buddhism Began, 51) regards the Buddhist “ethicization” of karma as nothing less than “a turning point in the history of civilization.”
36
C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 72;
cf. Maurice Cranston, Freedom (London: Longman, Green, & Co., 1953), 14–15. This strategy
is not universal, of course. Sometimes an inversion of the emotive valence accompanies the
redefinition of a term. For example, the Buddha’s reinterpretation of the three Vedic fires
as those of rāga, dosa, and moha, entails an obvious reversal of the term’s emotive valence.
See Norman, “Theravāda Buddhism and Brahmanical Hinduism,” 194.
37
Pollock, Language of the Gods, 51.
38
See Collins, Selfless Persons, 32, on the “culturally hegemonous” position of Brahmanical
thought vis-à-vis early Buddhism. See also Greg Baily and Ian Mabbett, The Sociology of Early
Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121: “A heterodox or minority
tradition needs to relate itself to the orthodox or mainstream practice; almost necessarily,
Buddhism mapped itself upon a structure supplied by the brahmins, defining itself by reference to what it was not; a series of systematic oppositions identified its relationship to the
pre-existing orthodoxy.”
39
Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1984), 37. As “an art of the weak” tactics involve guile and deception. See
Cranston, Freedom, 15, on the deceptive quality of Stevenson’s concept of “persuasive” definition.
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the Buddhist adherent; action (kamma/karma) becomes a metaphor for
the intention behind an action.40
This idea of forging a distinctive sense of identity by ironically troping
the terminology of a hegemonic adversary sheds light on the controversial question of early Buddhism’s stance with respect to the ātman.
The locus classicus of the not-self doctrine in the Pāli canon is the
Anattalakkhan a Sutta (“Discourse on the [fact of things having the]
Characteristic of Not-self”),41 traditionally the Buddha’s second sermon.
In a formulaic dialogue found in several places in the Canon, the Buddha42 pursues the following line of questioning with five disciples regarding the five constituents (khandha), starting with physical form or
body (rūpa):
What do you think, O monks, is the body permanent or
impermanent?
Impermanent, Sir.
And what is impermanent, is that pleasant or unpleasant?
Unpleasant, Sir.
Then is that which is impermanent, unpleasant, and subject to
change fittingly regarded as, “This is mine; I am this; this is my self
 mama, evoham asmi, eso me attā]”?
[etam
Surely not, Sir.
So also is it with feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), the conditioning factors (san khārā), and consciousness (viññān a).43
The recognition that none of the five constituents are the self engenders
disgust (nibbindati; Skt. nis ⫹ avid) for them. Turning away from them,
the ideal disciple (ariyasāvako) becomes detached (virajjati); being detached he is liberated (vimuccati) from the cycle of rebirth.44
As many interpreters have noted, in passages like this the Buddha
40
Richard Gombrich, “The Buddha and the Jains: A Reply to Professor Bronkhorst,” Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques 48, no. 4 (1994): 1081, and How Buddhism Began, 42.
41
This is how Collins (Selfless Persons, 97) translates the title.
42
Here I refer to “the Buddha” as portrayed in the Pāli Suttas, without presuming that this
portrayal corresponds—or fails to correspond—to the extra-textual, “historical” Śākyamuni
Buddha, who I fear, pace Gombrich (What the Buddha Thought, 17, 95–96), will forever remain
largely inaccessible to us.
43
Swāmı̄ Dwārikādās Shāstrı̄, ed., The Sam
 yuttanikāyapāli, vol. 2. (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati,
2000), 829; cf. F. L. Woodward, trans., The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Sanyutta-Nikāya), pt. 3
(London: Pali Text Society, 1917), 59–60. On the translation of the five khandhas (rūpa,
vedanā, saññā, sam
 khāra, and viññān a), see Rupert Gethin, “The Five Khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikāyas and Early Abhidhamma,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 14 (1986): 36–37.
44
Śāstri, The Sam
 yuttanikāyapāli, 830.
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does not explicitly deny the existence of the self.45 Indeed, the Buddha’s
teaching here presupposes the concept of the attā as permanent (nicca)
and blissful (sukha).46 More specifically, the passage presupposes the
dichotomy in earlier Vedic-Upanis adic speculation between, on the one
hand, the nonvalued impersonal component parts of the phenomenal
self and, on the other, the animating principle of those constituents,
the purusa or ātman, which is the source of whatever value the former
have.47 By being dissociated from the idea of self, these constituents are
drained of value.48 Here we note that the concept of the attā, like those
of dhamma, ariya, and brāhman a in the examples above, retains a positive
valence; indeed, without this positive valence the passage does not even
make sense.49 A line of modern interpreters, betraying the influence of
a once fashionable universalist ideology that regards Hinduism and Buddhism as teaching the same fundamental truth,50 have drawn the further
inference that the Buddha’s teaching here implies a belief in or, better,
an experiential awareness of,51 the existence of a transcendental ātman.52
In the Anattalakkhan a Sutta, we are led to infer, the Buddha taught a
version of the later Vedāntic doctrine of ātmānātmaviveka, the discrimination of the true self from the physical and psychological entities
45
Johannes Bronkhorst, Buddhist Teaching in India (Boston: Wisdom, 2009), 24; Oetke, “Ich”
und das Ich, 89, 153; Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, 101 n. 2; cf. K. R. Norman, “A Note
on Attā in the Alagaddūpama-Sutta,” in Studies in Indian Philosophy, ed. Dalsukh Malvania and
Nagin J. Shah (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1981), 28. In the Alagaddūpama
Sutta, however, he comes extremely close. Thus Norman concludes his article on attā in the
Alaggaddūpama Sutta with the remark “I think it is correct to conclude that by implication,
if not explicitly, the Buddha denied the existence of the permanent individual self” (28).
46
Norman, “A Note on Attā in the Alagaddūpama-Sutta,” 22. Oetke (“Ich” und das Ich, 161)
observes that while such statements imply the idea of the ātman, they do not necessarily imply
its existence.
47
Collins, Selfless Persons, 81–83, 113. According to Collins, this analysis of the human person
can be traced back to the Vedic homologization of various parts of the human body to the
cosmic counterparts into which the former are dispersed at death (49). Compare Stanislaw
Schayer, “Kamalaśı̄las Kritik des Puggalavāda,” Rocznik orjentalistyczny 8 (1931–32): 70.
48
Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, trans. V. M. Bedekar (Delhi: Motilal Banarsiddas, 1973), 152–53.
49
Although the positive valence of attā here may simply reflect the Buddha’s pragmatic,
strategic appeal to the presuppositions of his audience.
50
Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, L’Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme Ancien (Paris: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1973), 114, 137–40; Joaquı́n Pérez-Remón, Self and Non-self in Early
Buddhism (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1980), 155; R. P. Chowdhury, “Interpretation of the
‘Anatta’ Doctrine of Buddhism: A New Approach,” in Buddhist Sects and Philosophies, ed. Mahendra P. Mittal (Delhi: Originals, 2003), 200–201; Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy,
2nd ed. (London, 1929), 385.
51
See Bhattacharya, L’Ātman-Brahman, 22–24, 74–75.
52
Pérez-Remón, Self and Non-self, 158 ff.; Bhattacharya, L’Ātman-Brahman, 65; Chowdhury,
“Interpretation of the ‘Anatta’ Doctrine,” 198; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, “The Self: An Overlooked
Buddhist Simile,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 2 (April 1937):
260.
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falsely confused with it.53 And yet, such an interpretation, apart from
audaciously, perhaps even arrogantly, disregarding the testimony of virtually the entire Buddhist tradition,54 overlooks a subtle yet vital shift
in emphasis away from the Brahmanical-Upanis adic preoccupation with
the knowledge of the ātman as the means to liberation to the active
turning away from those things that are erroneously regarded as the
self,55 that is, from a gnoseological quest for efficacious knowledge to
a path of moral and spiritual discipline. As Johannes Bronkhorst argues,
the Buddha’s conspicuous silence on the nature of the ātman indicates
a rejection of what was one of the main soteriological options current
at the time, namely, knowledge of a transcendental self that takes no
part in action or its fruits (karma).56 As we shall see presently, the idea
of moral retribution in the theory of karma was one of the defining
commitments of Buddhism.57
Within time, perhaps under the influence of the notion of efficacious
knowledge in Vedic religion,58 the Buddhist tradition developed the
notion that liberation could be brought about by a form of special
knowledge or insight. In the earliest sources, the content of this liberating insight was identified with the Four Noble Truths. The awk53
This connection is explicit in Chowdhury (“Interpretation of the ‘Anatta’ Doctrine,” 200),
implicit in Bhattacharya, L’Ātman-Brahman, and Pérez-Remón, Self and Non-self.
54
See Steven Collins’s harsh criticism of Pérez-Remón for the latter’s decision to disregard
the self-understanding of the living traditions of Buddhism (“Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism:
Review Article,” Numen 29, no. 2 [December 1982]: 254, cf. 250–51, 271). I suspect that what
is ultimately at stake in this “perennialist” line of interpretation is a refusal to recognize the
legitimacy of an oppositional dimension of religion in general and of Buddhism in particular.
Pérez-Remón (154) speaks pejoratively of the doctrine of “absolute” anattā as the product of
the tradition’s “ideological development” after the Buddha. Chowdhury (“Interpretation of
the ‘Anatta’ Doctrine,” 191) asserts that “a search for a school against which the Anattā
doctrine was directed is bound to be futile.” Bhattacharya (L’Ātman-Brahman, 137) concludes
his study with the judgment that “notre controverse n’est qu’une querelle de mots. . . . Il
n’y a pas de contradiction entre ātman et anātman.”
55
Bronkhorst, Buddhist Teaching in India, 35.
56
Ibid., 27, 123; cf. Bronkhorst, Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India (Stuttgart: Steiner,
1986), 52, 57, 95.
57
Compare Etienne Lamotte’s statement (cited in Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, 49) that
“the doctrine of the act, karman, is the keystone of the entire Buddhist edifice.” According
to Lilian Silburn (Instant et cause [Paris: Vrin, 1955], 127, 163), the theory of karma served
as the Middle Way between two extreme views, eternalism and annihilationism (śāśvatavāda
and ucchedavāda, respectively), both of which shared a denial of the moral act and its consequences.
58
Bronkhorst, Buddhist Teaching in India, 29–30; Lambert Schmithausen, “On Some Aspects
of Descriptions or Theories of ‘Liberating Insight’ and ‘Enlightenment’ in Early Buddhism,”
in Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus, Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, ed. Klaus Bruhn and
Albrecht Wezler (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), 211, and “Zur Struktur der erlösenden Erfahrung
im indischen Buddhismus,” in Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils: Das Problem in
indischer und christlicher Tradition, ed. Gerhard Oberhammer (Vienna: De Nobili Research
Library, 5, 1978), 103.
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wardness of this identification—somewhat embarrassingly, the Four Noble Truths themselves do not mention ignorance as a cause of
suffering—strongly suggests that this understanding of the Four Truths
as the content of liberating insight was a later use of this teaching.59
According to Bronkhorst, the notion of liberating knowledge functioned
as something of a placeholder, to be filled with whatever was regarded
as the essential or fundamental teaching of Buddhism.60 Eventually the
Four Noble Truths were supplanted by the teaching of Dependent Origination (Pā. paticcasamuppāda; Skt. pratı̄tyasamutpāda) as the most fundamental and soteriologically relevant of the Buddha’s teachings.61 In
most of the so-called Hı̄nayāna schools, the doctrine of dependent origination was in turn supplanted in this role by the doctrine of the nonexistence of a substantial self (nairātmya).62 The belief in a substantial
self came to be regarded as the basis of all forms of delusion and suffering.63 At the end of this development stands an idea that might be
taken as a symbol of Buddhism’s ironic stance vis-à-vis Brahmanism,
namely, that “the rejection of the liberating knowledge of others becomes itself a liberating knowledge.”64 From the centrality of the question of the self and its existence in the later Brahmanical-Buddhist debates, we might infer that apologetical issues were a major factor in this
identification of the not-self doctrine with the content of liberating
insight.65 Indeed, one suspects that this soteriological promotion of the
not-self doctrine coincides with its assuming the role of a symbolic
marker of opposition to Brahmanical thought.66
59

Schmithausen, “On Some Aspects,” 208.
Bronkhorst, Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India, 96. But see Gombrich, “The
Buddha and the Jains,” 1073.
61
Franz Bernhard, “Zur Interpretation der Pratı̄tyasamutpāda-Formel,” Wiener Zeitschrift für
die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, vols. 12–13 (1968–69): 55. Based on a philological analysis and
comparison of various narratives of the night of the Buddha’s enlightenment, Ernst Waldschmidt (“Die Erleuchtung des Buddha,” in Von Ceylon bis Turfan [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 1967], 228) concludes that those texts in which an insight into the chain of
dependent origination immediately precedes the Buddha’s enlightenment (during the third
watch of the night) are later than those texts in which the Buddha attains enlightenment
upon having an insight into the Four Noble Truths.
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Schmithausen, “On Some Aspects,” 212; Bronkhorst, Buddhist Teaching in India, 31.
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See Schmithausen, “Zur Struktur der erlösenden Erfahrung im indischen Buddhismus,”
113; Silburn, Instant et cause, 160.
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Bronkhorst, Buddhist Teaching in India, 28, cf. 104.
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As Wilhelm Halbfass (Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken [Munich: Diederichs,
2000], 192) observes, “the rejection of the Buddhist ‘doctrine of not-self’ was for centuries
one of the chief concerns of the Hindu philosophical schools.”
66
I believe this hypothesis goes a long way to meeting Gombrich’s (“The Buddha and the
Jains,” 1073) objection to Bronkhorst’s “placeholder” theory, namely, that it is implausible
“to claim that Buddhism began as a teaching without a doctrine. Has any religion ever spread
without a doctrine?” There always was—obviously—content to Buddhist teaching, but what
was doctrinally important to Buddhism—what marked the distinctiveness of Buddhism vis-à60
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The emergence of the not-self doctrine as a marker of Buddhist identity might be compared with the analogous role of the doctrine of the
divinity of Christ in the development of Christian theology. As Daniel
Boyarin argues, the understanding of Christ as a second divine principle
(as the Word, or Logos, of God) did not become a touchstone of Christian identity (and, concomitantly, the rejection of such a claim in the
Jewish) until the third or even fourth century, when a clear borderline
was formed between the Christian and Jewish communities.67 Up until
this time there were, on the one hand, non-Christian Jews who believed
in a second divine principle (God’s Word, Wisdom, or Son) mediating
between a transcendent Godhead and the material world and, on the
other, followers of Jesus who held that Christ was simply a name for the
manifestation of a single divine personality.68 In the example of the
relation between Buddhism and Brahmanical thought, by contrast, the
separation was likely there from the beginning. Nevertheless, the idea
of not-self may not yet have acquired the role of a boundary marker in
the period of Buddhism reflected in the Pāli Nikāyas.69
reconciling the anattā doctrine with karma theory
One indication that a concept has been motivated in part by a need to
mobilize communal identity is a tension with everyday experience and/
or other defining tenets of a belief system.70 The ideological dimension
vis its proximate rivals—probably depended on the ideological landscape of a particular time
and place. On the way in which the central teachings of an intellectual tradition are largely
determined by a changeable complex of social oppositions, see Randall Collins’s wide-ranging
study of the social structure of intellectual life in a variety of historical-cultural contexts, The
Sociology of Philosophies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). I am grateful to one
of my anonymous reviewers for bringing Collins’s book to my attention.
67
Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Up
through the second century, and in some areas perhaps much later, Christianity can be
regarded as a strand of Hellenistic Judaism, albeit one that separated itself from other strands
by attaching special importance to Jesus (see Birger A. Pearson, “The Emergence of Christian
Religion,” in The Emergence of Christian Religion: Essays on Early Christianity [Harrisburg, PA:
Trinity Press International, 1997], 15). One could argue that even after the borderline was
established, the divinity of Christ was not unambiguously affirmed in Christian circles until
the official condemnation of Arianism in the Council of Nicaea in 325.
68
Boyarin, Border Lines, 90, 92.
69
This is not to suggest, however, that the notion of the nonexistence of the ātman was a
falsification of early “Nikāyan” Buddhism (as Pérez-Remón, Bhattacharya, and others presume), any more than the notion of the divinity of Christ was a falsification of early Christian
teaching. Such a position rests on the questionable assumption that the identity sustaining
doctrines of a religious community are only legitimate if they are self-generated, in other
words, that a conception of religious identity is somehow inauthentic if it can be shown that
it developed in active and often conflictual relations with rival communities.
70
See Martin Southwold, “Buddhism and the Definition of Religion,” Man 13, no. 3 (September 1978): 374–76, on the usefulness of “empirically indeterminate” doctrines in demarcating cultural communities and strengthening their identity and solidarity.
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of the anattā doctrine—here I use the term ideology in a neutral, rather
than pejorative, sense to denote a discourse that functions to mobilize
a social group—manifests itself in a tension not only with the everyday
experience of selfhood (the sense of individuality and of the continuity
of personal experience through time) but also, and perhaps more challenging from a purely doctrinal standpoint, with the ideas of karma and
rebirth. Much of the intellectual labor of Buddhist thinkers through
the ages has been devoted to answering the question posed by virtually
every beginning undergraduate student of Buddhism, namely, if there
is no self, who or what is it that is reborn, and to whom or what does
karma adhere?
As mentioned above, the notions of karma and rebirth—or, in other
words, the belief in the moral retribution of actions within a time frame
extending beyond the present life span—together comprise one of the
defining commitments of Buddhism. In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, the
Buddha affirmed the theory of karma against a colorful group of six
contemporary teachers, each of whom, from various theoretical perspectives, denied it. The various teachings represented by this motley
group can be classified into two basic categories: determinism and materialism.71 The determinist doctrine, known under the general heading
of Ājı̄vikism in India, is exemplified by Makkhali Gosala, who held that
“the attainment of any given condition, of any character, does not depend either on one’s own acts, or on the acts of another, or on human
effort.”72 Another member of this group, Ajita Kesakambalı̄, exemplifies
the materialist doctrine. He taught that the human being consists without remainder of four elements that are absorbed into their respective
cosmic counterparts upon death.73 What these doctrines of determinism
and materialism have in common is a denial of karmic retribution: the
71
Collins, Selfless Persons, 35. The six teachers can be further subdivided: The first member
of this group, Pūran a Kassapa, taught an antinomian doctrine (“to him who kills a living
creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, . . . who commits robbery, or
adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acing there is no guilt” [Müller, Sacred Books of the
Buddhists, 69]); the sixth, Sañjaya Belatthiputta, agnosticism. The fifth, Nigan tha Nātaputta,
can be identified with Vardhamāna Mahāvı̄ra, the founder of Jainism. See A. L. Basham,
History and Doctrines of the Ājı̄vikas (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 10–18.
72
Müller, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 71; cf. Swāmı̄ Dwārikādās Shāstrı̄, ed. and trans.,
Dı̄ghanikāyapāli, pt. 1, Sı̄lakkhandha Vagga (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1996), 59, lines 8–9:
“nathi attakāre, nathi parakāre, nathi purisakāre.” The doctrines of three of the six teachers
mentioned in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, namely, Pūran a Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, and Pakudha Kaccāyana, are associated with later Ājı̄vikism (Basham, History and Doctrines of the
Ājı̄vikas, 17).
73
Shāstrı̄, Dı̄ghanikāya, 61, lines 5–7: “cātumahābhūtiko ayam
 puriso; yadā kālam
 karoti,
pathavı̄ pathavikāyam
 anupeti anupagacchati, āpo āpokāyam
 anupeti anupagacchati; tejo tejokāyam
 anupeti anupagacchati; vāyo vāyokāyam
 anupeti anupagacchati; ākāsam
 indriyāni
saṅkamanti.” Compare Müller, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 73–74.
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former by denying any influence of (intentional) action on future existential states, the latter by denying an afterlife in which such karmic
effects could be realized.74
It was by affirming, against contemporary materialist and determinist
currents of thought, the ideas of karma and rebirth, while at the same
time denying, against both Brahmins and Jains, the idea of a permanent
self, that Buddhism carved out a niche for itself in its ancient Indian
religious milieu. In other words, it established a distinctive identity by
waging an ideological war on two fronts, against the materialists and
Ājı̄vikas on the one side and the Brahmins and Jains on the other.75
Buddhism rather tendentiously represented its relationship to its two
principal adversaries with the rhetoric of the Middle Way: the Brahmins
and the Jains with their theory of the self (ātmavāda) represented the
extreme of eternalism (Pā. sassatavāda; Skt. śāsvatavāda), the materialists
and the Ājı̄vikas with their denial of an afterlife the extreme of annihilationism (ucchedavāda).
In defining itself over against these two adversaries, early Buddhism
committed itself to the difficult task of affirming the ideas of karma and
rebirth without the support of the notion of a transmigrating entity or
principle.76 Such was the aim of “the oldest work to express the denial
of the soul in detail and in full clarity,” the Milindapañha (“Milinda’s
Questions”).77 This dialogue between the Graeco-Bactrian king Milinda
(Meneander, ca. 250 BCE) and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena is essentially an extended reply to the king’s objection to the proposition, baldly
stated by Nāgasena at the outset of the dialogue, that “no person is
found here”78 Alluding to the heretical teaching of Ajita Kesakambalı̄
mentioned above, the king states the most fundamental of the many
unacceptable consequences of this denial of the self: “There is no fruit
or ripening of deeds well or ill done.”79 In the course of the dialogue,
Nāgasena attempts to disabuse the King of the latter’s quite understand74
The extreme sarcasm of the Buddha against the followers of Makkhali, as compared to
his somewhat milder attitude toward the Brahmins and their rites, testifies to the importance
of karma for the early Buddhist tradition. See Silburn, Instant et cause, 161.
75
Halbfass, Karma und Wiedergeburt, 184.
76
Ibid., 33, 107.
77
Erich Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin: Akademie, 1969), 65. Oetke
(“Ich” und das Ich, 180, 185), however, argues that the Milindapañha’s rejection of a puggala
existing separately from the five khandhas falls short of an absolute denial of a self.
78
“na h’ettha puggalo upalabbhati”; V. Trenckner, ed. The Milindapañho (London: Pali Text
Society, 1962), 25. See also Kapstein, Reason’s Traces, 79–81, for an excellent discussion of the
locution “no self/person is found here” in the Buddhist tradition.
79
Trenckner, Milindapañho, 25, line 27; cf. Shāstrı̄, Dı̄ghanikāya, 61, line 2: “natthi sukatadukkatānam
 kammānam
 phalam
 vipāko”; the English translation in the text is from I. B.
Horner, Milinda’s Questions, vol. 1 (London: Luzac, 1963), 35.
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able concern that the anattā doctrine is incompatible with the law of
moral retribution and the idea of rebirth. Nāgasena does this mainly
through a series of engaging images and analogies. In one of the text’s
more memorable images, the monk persuades the king that rebirth can
occur without the presupposition of an enduring, changeless self by
comparing the process of rebirth to a flame that burns continuously
through the night.80 Through its various illustrations, the text shows
that the notion of a causal connection between the discrete members
of a temporal series suffices to preserve the notion of moral responsibility. It is because the mangoes planted by one person are causally
connected (though not, according to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness [ksan avāda], substantively identical) to those later stolen
by another that the latter is subject to punishment.81 This notion of a
causal series, which the Milindapañha is content to suggest through a
series of images and analogies, finds more developed articulation in
Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa (fifth century CE). In the third chapter
of this work, Vasubandhu argues that the chain of dependent origination
(Pā. paticcasamuppāda; Skt. pratı̄tyasamutpāda) suffices, without the additional assumption of a substantial self, to explain the mechanism of
karma and rebirth.82 The doctrine of dependent origination—the doctrine that, as expressed in the shorthand Pāli formula, “When that is,
this becomes; from the arising of that, this arises; when that is not, this
is not; from the cessation of that, this ceases”83—takes the place of the
self as the underlying presupposition of karma and samsāra. This doctrine, however, particularly in its developed formulation as a circular
chain of twelve links, is obscure, as even the Buddha himself is said to
have admitted.84 Its obscurity, one suspects, has as much to do with the
intractability of the problem for which it is the proffered solution,
namely, explaining the mechanism of rebirth without the assumption
of a transmigrating person or self,85 as it does with the awkwardness and
80

Trenckner, Milindapañho, 40, lines 20–32; Horner, Milinda’s Questions, 55–56, cf. 97.
Trenckner, Milindapañho, 46, lines 16–29; Horner, Milinda’s Questions, 64, cf. 98.
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Alexis Sanderson, “The Sarvāstivāda and Its Critics: Anātmavāda and the Theory of
Karma,” in Buddhism into the Year 2000 (Los Angeles: Dhammakaya Foundation, 1994), 37;
Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, 77.
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“imasmim
 sati idam
 hoti, imassuppādā idam uppajjati; imasmin asati idam
 na hoti, imassa
nirodhā idam nirujjhati.” See, e.g., M. Leon Feer, ed., Sam
 yutta-Nikāya, pt. 2 (London: Pali
Text Society, 1960), 65, lines 5–7. Compare Shāstrı̄, Abhidharmakośa, pt. 2, 432, lines 14–15.
84
Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, 165–66. In the Mahānidāna Sutta, the Buddha
reproves Ānanda for the latter’s opinion that the doctrine is clear and only appears deep
(gambhı̄ra).
85
See Collins, Selfless Persons, 108: “When taken as a whole, it [the twelvefold formula of
Dependent Origination] expressed, symbolically, the idea of ‘the round of rebirth’ without
the reincarnating self or person which Brahmanical thinking had postulated.”
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complexity—owing to its probable composite nature—of its scholastic
formulation.86
One indication of the intractability of the karma-without-self problematic is the recurrence, at several points in the history of Buddhism,
of various functional equivalents of the self, many of which were
shrewdly denounced by rival Buddhist sects as attempts to smuggle the
self into Buddhism through the back door.87 The most notorious of these
was the notion of the person (Pā. puggala, Skt. pudgala) put forward by
the Vātsı̄putrı̄ya-Sām
 mitı̄ya schools early on in the history of Buddhism.88
In order to explain the mechanism of karma and rebirth, as well as the
phenomena of self-consciousness and memory, these so-called Personalist (Pā. Puggalavādin; Skt. Pudgalavādin) schools posited a personal
principle that was neither separate from nor identical with the five skandhas.89 They compared the relation of the person to the aggregates to
86
Frauwallner (History of Indian Philosophy, 166–68) proposed the plausible hypothesis that
the twelvefold sequence is the result of the mechanical addition of what were originally two
parallel sequences. See also Bernhard, 56–57, 61–63. Much of the obscurity can be traced to
the ambiguity of viññān a, “consciousness,” the third link in the chain. On the one hand,
viññān a is included among the five aggregates that are declared impermanent and “selfless”
(Frauwallner History of Indian Philosophy, 160, 162). On the other hand, viññān a emerged as
the most prominent of the aggregates; it was the constituent of the personality serving as the
link between different existences (Bareau, “La notion de personne,” 91; cf. Lambert Schmithausen, “Critical Response,” in Karma and Rebirth: Post-classical Developments, ed. Ronald W.
Neufeldt [Albany: SUNY Press, 1986], 217). This latter role is implicit in the sequence of
links in the twelvefold sequence of dependent origination. Viññān a immediately precedes
nāma-rūpa (“name and form”), the physical and psychical manifestation of a new birth. The
viññān a that enters into the mother’s womb corresponds, in other Indian systems, to the
“fine body” (sūksmam
 śarı̄ram) that develops into the fetus (Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, 162–63). To the extent that the doctrine of dependent origination is ambiguous about
the role of viññān a in the process of rebirth, it begs the question of a transmigrating principle.
87
Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1962), 132: “So strong indeed is the practical and theoretical need for the
assumption of a permanent factor in connection with the activities of a ‘person,’ that in
addition to the Pudgalavādins, other schools also felt obliged to introduce it more or less
furtively in a disguised form, though the word ‘self ’ remained taboo at all times.” The first
of these could have been the viññān a (“consciousness”), which functioned as the vehicle of
rebirth in the cycle of dependent origination notwithstanding the fact that, in the Mahātan hāsaṅkhaya Sutta, the Buddha, rejected, in the strongest terms, the “evil opinion” that
viññān a was the vehicle of rebirth. See Thomas, History of Buddhist Thought, 103; Schmithausen,
“Critical Response,” 217.
88
The Sām
 matı̄ya was probably the most influential branch of the Vātsı̄putrı̄ya, soon even
eclipsing the latter. See L. S. Cousins, “Person and Self,” in Buddhism into the Year 2000 (Los
Angeles: Dhammakaya Foundation, 1994), 27; Bareau, Les sects bouddhiques du petit véhicule
(Saı̈gon: École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1955), 115. Bareau dates the appearance of the
Vātsı̄putrı̄ya at the third century BCE (14) and that of the Sammatı̄ya at a century before or
after the common era (121).
89
Thich Thiên Châu, “Les réponses des Pudgalavādin aux critiques des écoles bouddhiques,” Journal of the International Society for Buddhist Studies 10, no. 1 (1987): 40–41; Leonard
Priestley, Pudgalavāda Buddhism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 51; Silburn,
Instant et cause, 246–47.
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that of a fire to its fuel.90 They intended their concept of the person as
a Middle Way between the extremes of eternalism, represented by the
ātmavāda of the non-Buddhist schools, and annihilationism, which they
associated with the so-called skandhavāda, the rival Buddhist view that
the person exists only nominally.91 Against the polemical characterization put forward by rival schools like the Theravāda—the historical victors of this early intra-Buddhist struggle—it is important to emphasize
this point that the Pudgalavādins distinguished their concept of the
pudgala from the ātmavāda of the non-Buddhists.92 Of course, rival Buddhist schools rejected the distinction between the pudgalavāda and the
non-Buddhist ātmavāda as specious; the pudgala was merely the Brahmanical ātman under another name.93 As this criticism gained currency,
the Pudgalavādins came to be regarded by other Buddhists as outsiders.94
Another notable example of a Buddhist concept that assumed some of
the functions of a self was the “storehouse consciousness” (ālayavijñāna)
of the later Mahāyānist Cittamātra school.95 The storehouse conscious90
See Priestley, Pudgalavāda Buddhism, 165–86. The fuel fire comparison, however, is not
found in the earliest presentations of Puggalavādin teaching, such as the Kathavatthu. See
Cousins, “Person and Self,” 19.
91
Châu, “Les réponses des Pudgalavādin,” 39; Silburn, Instant et cause, 247; Cousins, “Person
and Self,” 18.
92
Schayer, “Kamalaśı̄las Kritik,” 72 n. 23; James P. McDermott, “Karma and Rebirth in Early
Buddhism,” in Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, ed. Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty
(Berkeley: University of California Press), 168. This they did by refusing to characterize the
pudgala as unconditioned (asam
 skrta). Specifically, they assigned the pudgala its own, unique
 skrta)
category of being (dharma), distinct from the three categories of conditioned (sam
dharmas (past, present, and future), and the one unconditioned dharma, nirvana. See Châu,
“Les réponses des Pudgalavādin,” 42; Priestley, Pudgalavāda Buddhism, 79.
93
See, e.g., Kamalśı̄la’s Pañjikā on Śāntaraksita’s Tattvasam
 graha (Schayer, “Kamalaśı̄las Kritik,” 72). The Puggalavādins rendered themselves particularly vulnerable to this charge by
using terms like ātman, jı̄va, and purusa as equivalents for their concept of the pudgala (Priestley, Pudgalavāda Buddhism, 81–83, 187; see also Joseph Walser, Nāgārjuna in Context (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2005), 201. This might suggest that the Personalist Controversy
played an important role in the development of the doctrine of not-self. Indeed, according
to Thomas (History of Buddhist Thought, 101), the rejection of the ātman appears to have
become more intense with the growth of the controversy. Or perhaps we could infer that in
reacting against it, “orthodox” Buddhism radicalized its understanding of the anātmavāda,
understanding it as skandhavāda, the view that the self or person referred to no reality irreducible to, or existing apart from the five skandhas.
94
See Silburn, Instant et cause, 246: “Parmi les Buddhistes les Vātsı̄putrı̄ya côtoient de si près
l’hérésie que certains Buddhistes n’hésitent pas à les ranger parmi les infidels (Tı̄rthika).”
Significantly, however, this does not appear to be the case with the Katthāvatthu, the earliest
source for Pudgalavāda views. That the Kathāvatthu appears to recognize the Pudgalavāda as
a rival interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching, albeit an incorrect one, suggests that at this
time, the interpretation of anātmavāda was still rather more fluid; only when anātmavāda was
more or less identified with skandhavāda were the Pudgalavādins regarded as being outside
the pale.
95
Lambert Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central
Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987), 3.
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ness served as a repository for the “seeds” linking previous acts with the
personal experiences ostensibly resulting therefrom.96 Like the earlier
Pudgalavādins, the Cittamātra tradition strenuously denied the charge
that their storehouse consciousness was merely the self under a different
name.97
From these examples, it would appear that the ideas of karma and
rebirth presuppose some functional equivalent of the self, that is, some
connecting link between one karmically determined existence and another. This is not to say, of course, that karma theory presupposes the
permanent, unchanging self of Brahmanical-Upanis adic thought. And
yet the polemical context in which Buddhism developed the not-self
doctrine, to the extent that this doctrine functioned as a boundary
marker with respect to Brahmanism, discouraged nuanced distinctions
between different concepts of selfhood. Perhaps one could venture the
generalization that a strong interest in demarcation encourages the
formation of binary oppositions like self versus not-self, as opposed to
relative distinctions like self and person.98 Polemical demands thus prohibited Buddhist thinkers from using the terms attā and puggala in technical contexts, even in those dealing with karmic retribution and rebirth,
where the use of such terms would appear to be almost unavoidable.
The situation has a close parallel in the realm of politics, where partisans
are sometimes forced to adopt awkward circumlocutions in their effort
to avoid terms that have been successfully claimed by their adversaries.
According to Conze (Buddhist Thought in India, 131), the Pudgalavādins were the forerunners
of the Yogacārins with their storehouse consciousness. But see Schayer’s (“Kamalaśı̄las Kritik,”
71) reservations about the assumption of a close parallel between the two schools.
96
Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism (New York: Routledge, 1989), 91.
97
Ibid. Other examples of functional equivalents to self and person include: the Sarvāstivāda
concept of prāpti, “possession,” the unifying principle that channels a given karmic effect to
a particular sequence of dharmas (corresponding to the empirical personality) and not others
(see Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, 141; Bronkhorst, Buddhist Teaching in India, 91–92;
Schmithausen, “Critical Response,” 219); Vasubandhu’s concept of the “intermediate state”
(antarā bhāva) between death and rebirth, the “karmically determined combination of skandhas” that links one existence to another (McDermott, “Karma and Rebirth,” 170–71); the
Abhidharma concept of bhavaṅga, conceived of as “a transmitting factor in rebirth” (see Bruce
Matthews, “Post-Classical Developments in the Concepts of Karma and Rebirth in Theravāda
Buddhism,” in Neufeldt, Karma and Rebirth, 128, 130); and, finally, the Mahāyān a concept of
the tathāgatagarbha (“Buddha nature”). This latter not only fulfills some of the functions of
the self, particularly in safeguarding Buddhist teaching from nihilism, but is also, strikingly,
sometimes (particularly in the Mahāparinirvān asūtra) called ātman, albeit in a qualified sense
(Ruegg, Buddha-Nature, 19–26; Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism, 98–100). Williams (Mahāyāna
Buddhism, 100) speculates that the use of the term ātman in texts like the Mahāparinirvān asūtra
reflects the resurgence of Hindu culture in the Gupta period.
98
That being said, one does not have to accept uncritically the traditional view that doctrinal
development unfolds according to an inner logic that overrides historical contingencies. Given
a different set of historical conditions, I do not think it inconceivable that the Puggalavādins
could have won the day, for they were able to present their puggalavāda plausibly in terms
of the Middle Way and thus reject the sassatavāda of the Brahmanical doctrine of the ātman.
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We have seen, then, that the Buddhist tradition, in its effort to differentiate itself from Brahmanical thought on the one side and Ājı̄vikamaterialist thought on the other, found itself faced with the task of
reconciling what on the surface might appear to be two contradictory
claims, namely, the doctrine of not-self, understood in a more or less
absolute sense, and the ideas of karma and rebirth. It was thus in response to this problematic of rebirth-without-self that the Buddhist tradition developed a range of concepts, most notably the doctrine of
dependent origination, whose subtlety and profundity might easily appear, from a less charitable standpoint, as obscurity and ambiguity.99
Here we might draw an illuminating parallel with the development of
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine is also the product
of the need to reconcile two prima facie contradictory claims, namely,
the divinity of Christ and monotheism. Each of these claims, moreover,
like those of not-self and karma in Buddhism, served to demarcate the
early Church from rival religious traditions; together they established
a distinctive sense of identity for early Christianity in its original Hellenistic milieu. According to the admittedly stylized presentation of the
fourth-century Cappadocian theologian Gregory of Nyssa, the affirmation of Christ or the Word as a distinct divine hypostasis distinguishes
Christianity from Judaism, while the affirmation of the unity of the
divine nature distinguishes Christianity from the polytheism of the
Greeks.100 The problematic of reconciling biblical monotheism with the
divinity of Christ was eventually resolved, after a tumultuous period of
confusion, uncertainty, and controversy, with the three-persons-in-onesubstance formula that gives orthodox expression to this central Christian mystery. In order to avoid the pitfalls of tritheism (i.e., the belief
in three separate divine principles), on the one side, and monarchianism (the denial that the Son and Spirit are independent and fully
divine principles), on the other, the formula depends on a manufactured—critics would say specious—distinction between hypostasis (“person”) and ousia (“substance”).101
99
Perhaps the ultimate testimony to the difficulty of reconciling the anattā doctrine with
karma theory is the fact that most Buddhists in places like Śri Lanka and Burma, concerned
as they are with merit and karma, apparently do not understand its “proper,” official meaning
(Gombrich, Buddhist Precept and Practice, 84–87; Spiro, Buddhism and Society, 88–89).
100
Edward R. Hardy, ed., Christology of the Later Fathers (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1954), 274: “The teaching of the Jew is invalidated by the acceptance of the Word and by
belief in the Spirit; while the polytheistic error of the Greeks is done away, since the unity
of the nature cancels the notion of plurality.”
101
Hypostasis and ousia were not clearly distinguished before the fourth century. Indeed,
they were often used synonymously, as, for example, by the third-century theologian Origen.
See R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (New York: Clark, 1988), 181–
90, and cf. 66.
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Up to this point, our analysis may point to a cynical conclusion: ideological demands force religious communities to develop and profess
obscure and ambiguous doctrines that, to the extent that they are intelligible, stand in tension with everyday experience. And yet, it is thanks
to the pressure exerted by these same ideological demands, I would now
like to suggest, that such doctrines can function as leverage points from
which everyday experience can be transformed in productive ways.
transformative discourse and authority
In this final part of the essay, I would like to reflect on the transformative
dimension of the not-self doctrine in light of the thesis, developed
above, that this doctrine was motivated in large part by an interest in
mobilizing Buddhist identity against the Brahmanical order. In his analysis of anattā in the Theravāda tradition, Steven Collins makes an important distinction between the doctrinal acceptance and the psychological realization of this teaching. These two modalities of anattā
correspond to different stages in an aspirant’s spiritual progress. In the
initial stages of one’s spiritual development, an acceptance of the notself doctrine intercepts the natural tendency to convert the experienced
sense of “I” into a theoretical belief in the self.102 The loss of this “personality belief ” (sakkāyaditthi) marks the attainment of “stream winner”
status, that is, the status of one who, by virtue of having set forth on
the Path, is certain to attain enlightenment after a limited number of
rebirths.103 Ideally, particularly if this acceptance of the not-self doctrine
is incorporated into a regimen of meditative self-analysis, this spontaneous sense of “I” gradually weakens as it is deprived of theoretical
support.104 As mentioned above, the aim of insight meditation is the
reclassification of experience in terms of devalued, impersonal categories. This redescription of experience strips everyday experiences and
attachments of the names that would otherwise secure and stabilize them
in being. The eventual loss of the autonomic sense of ego—which loss
marks the experiential realization of anattā—constitutes the achievement of arhat status, the attainment of nirvana in this life.105 When the
contents of consciousness are no longer experienced in relation to a
102

Collins, Selfless Persons, 93–94.
Ibid., 94.
Ibid., 95.
105
Ibid., 94. Up until this point, one can affirm the truth of anattā and yet still continue
to experience oneself as an “I,” as illustrated by the story of the elderly monk Khemaka (M.
Leon Feer, ed., Sam
 yutta-Nikāya, pt. 3 [London: Pali Text Society, 1960]), who admits that
despite recognizing each of the five khandhas to be anattā, he continues to experience a
residual sense of “I am.” Compare Collins, Selfless Persons, 95.
103
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putative self as their agent or bearer, one’s experience of reality has
obviously undergone a profound transformation.
Collins makes an astute observation about the anattā doctrine that
provides a clue to the link between its spiritual-transformative and ideological-political dimensions. The doctrine, he says, functions as a “linguistic taboo” in technical discourse,106 where he understands “taboo”
to refer, following Franz Steiner’s definition, to “all the social mechanisms of obedience which have a ritual significance.”107 The idea of
taboo highlights the “air of ineluctable and incontestable necessity” that
the idea of not-self has, for example, in the dialogue between Milinda
and Nagāsena in the Milindapañha.108 Collins, moreover, observes that
this taboo functions on both of the two levels that I am interested in
bringing into relation: first, it “forms part of a particular style of meditative self-analysis”; second, it “preserves the identity and integrity of
Buddhism as an Indian system separate from Brahmanism.”
These two functions, I would now like to suggest, do not simply run
alongside each other in parallel tracks; rather, they are intrinsically
linked. To see the relation between them, we must first recognize that
the anattā doctrine can be used to overcome deeply ingrained habits of
speech and mind only to the extent that it is imbued with a moral power
transcending the individual practitioner. The acceptance and interiorization of a doctrine so manifestly “against the current” (patisotam
 ) invites
an analysis in terms of Durkheim’s venerable distinction between the
individual and collective dimensions of human experience, between the
psychological and the sociological. What Durkheim writes about the
phenomenology of moral obligation would apply, a fortiori, to the Buddhist reclassification of experience in terms of impersonal categories:
“Our élan and aspiration are accompanied by discipline and effort. Even
when we carry out a moral act with enthusiasm we feel we dominate
and transcend ourselves, and this cannot occur without a feeling of
tension and restraint. We feel that we do violence to a part of our
being.”109 Another way of expressing this idea is that the use of the notself doctrine to restructure one’s experience of self and world presupposes a structure of authority, which is manifest in the doctrine’s taboo
character. This authority, moreover, is constituted by the recognition
of a social group.110
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Ibid., 12, 77, 149, 183.
Franz Steiner, Taboo (London: Cohen & West, 1956), 20; cited in Collins, Selfless Persons,
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Emile Durkheim, Sociology and Philosophy (New York: Free Press, 1974), 45.
The claim that the collective is the ultimate source of the authority of the anattā doctrine
is obviously an etic explanation. It is only by shifting to an etic, sociological perspective that
109
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In order to see the Durkheimian connection between the efficacy of
religious discourse and the constitution of a social group in the case
of the anattā doctrine, I find it helpful to understand the internalization
of anattā in terms of Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of performative language. Against formalist analyses of performative speech like J. L. Austin’s, Bourdieu argues that the source of the power of authoritative
discourse does not lie in the intrinsic properties of the discourse but
rather in “the institutional conditions of its production and reception.”111 In the final analysis, the authority of a given discourse is constituted by the collective recognition of the members of a social group.
In applying this analysis of performative language to the anattā doctrine,
one can begin by regarding the interiorized pronouncement, “this is
not mine, this I am not, this is not myself,” with respect to a given
concept or experience as a performative. This pronouncement reverses
and negates the acts of naming that establish the objects of conventional
experience with their associated values. Now, what is the source of the
authority thanks to which this formula can be used to disrupt and displace our everyday experience of self and world? On the most obvious
level, the pronouncement is authoritative because it is taken to come
from the Buddha himself and therefore to flow from his enlightenment
experience.112 This claim that the formula comes from the mouth of
the Buddha is in turn rooted in the authority of the Pāli Canon and
the belief in the reliability of the tradition that has preserved it.113 From
the perspective of a functionalist understanding of authority like that
of Bourdieu or the theologian David Kelsey, the authority of the Anattalakkhan a Sutta—its status as scripture, we might say—has to do with
the way it and other canonical texts are used in the life of Buddhist
communities.114 The recognition of its authority is instantiated in the
practices of meditation, liturgical recitation, scholastic commentary,
and doctrinal apologetics (among others). Ultimately, the effectiveness
the link between the psychological and political dimensions of anattā comes clearly into view.
Buddhists themselves would appeal to the authority of the Buddha’s enlightenment experience.
111
Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 111.
112
And is conducive to enlightenment, as suggested by the conclusion of the Anattalakkhan a
Sutta in which the five original disciples attain liberation upon hearing the Buddha’s discourse
on anattā.
113
Reynolds and Hallisey (“Buddhism,” 337) argue that a central factor in the emergence
of Buddhism as a new religious movement was the recognition of the Buddha and his enlightenment experience as “a new and ultimate source of sacred authority.”
114
David H. Kelsey (The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology [Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1975], 29–30, 109, 152) understands the authority of scripture (he is referring specifically to
the Christian Bible) not to refer to a set of properties ascribed to the canonical texts but
rather to the way these texts are used in the life of the community.
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of the anattā doctrine is rooted in the social reality of a community
with a clear sense of Buddhist identity.
It is here, finally, with the identification of the social group as the
basis of the authority of transformative discourse that the spiritual-transformative dimension of anattā links up with the oppositional-political.
For as we have seen, the doctrine of anattā, by defining Buddhism over
against other religious orders and movements, played—and continues
to play115—an important role in mobilizing and consolidating the identity of Buddhist communities.116 The refusal to name an experience as
having a relation with a self represents, on the psychological level of
self-analysis, the interiorized reflex of the “politically” motivated avoidance of the terminology—ātman and pudgala—of Buddhism’s historical
rivals.
In the foregoing argument, we have seen that the authority of anattā,
manifest in its taboo character, represents the “missing link” between
its soteriologically transformative and political-oppositional dimensions.
And it is here that we see the significance of having categorized anattā
as a theological doctrine rather than as a philosophical proposition.
For in doing so, we have considered the issue of authority, manifest
both in its use in mobilizing communal identity and in bringing about
psychological transformation, as integral to the discourse of anattā.117
conclusion
I have suggested the possibility that the use of the not-self doctrine to
mark a contrast with Vedic Brahmanism was logically, if not also temporally, prior to its use as a conceptual resource in practices of personal
transformation. If correct, anattā would thus be an example of a doc115
An excellent (and well-known) example is Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New
York: Grove Press, 1974), 51, and cf. 52, 56. Rahula declares that “Buddhism stands unique
in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such a soul, Self, or Ātman.”
He goes on to offer an invidious interpretation, à la Freud, of those religions affirming the
existence of such an entity as catering to an infantile psychological need for self-protection
(51–52).
116
Here we note that the very opacity of the doctrine does not necessarily diminish, and
indeed may actually enhance, its effectiveness in mobilizing communal identity. On this point,
see, e.g., Southwold, “Buddhism and the Definition of Religion,” 374: “This is why religions,
as cultural systems in which empirically indeterminate doctrines are crucial, are so effective
in identifying and distinguishing, unifying, and separating, cultural communities.” The obscurity and ambiguity of the doctrine not only enhances its political effectiveness by rendering
it amenable to a range of interpretations, but also preserves a structure of authority against
the corrosive effects of rationalization.
117
Stated differently, what is at stake in categorizing anattā as doctrine is recognizing it as
discourse, that is to say, as a linguistic form considered in relation to a particular context(s)
of utterance.
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trine that begins its life as a marker of communal difference but which
nevertheless becomes soteriologically transformative.
On the basis of analyses like the foregoing, one might hazard the
generalization that oppositionally motivated doctrines like not-self or
the divinity of Christ can have a transformative impact on the traditions
whose identity they sustain. To the extent that such doctrines sustain
a group’s sense of identity, they are largely impervious to empirical
discomfirmation and they resist modification. Indeed, under the right
conditions, they show a tendency toward radicalization, as can perhaps
be seen in the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda responses to the Pudgalavāda118 or in the Christian doctrine of consubstantiality (a radical specification of the notion of Christ’s divinity119), which was formulated in
response to the Arian controversy. Existing forms of religious belief and
practice—the concepts of karma and rebirth; the biblical doctrine of
God—have to be looked at afresh and made to harmonize with these
emergent formulations. Such doctrines can therefore take a tradition
in directions that no one had originally anticipated.120
118
I suspect that the Personalist Controversy played an important role in the development
from the rather elusive expressions of anattā in the Nikāyas to the explicit formulations in
later texts like the Abhidharmakośa and the Visuddhimagga.
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Originally, Christ’s divinity was most likely understood in terms of the legitimate exercise
of divine prerogatives, such as bestowing life or dispensing judgment (on this point, see
Marianne Meye Thompson, The God of the Gospel of John [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001],
47, 52–54). The later understanding of Christ’s divinity in terms of a shared essence or
substance therefore represents a radicalization of this earlier understanding.
120
I am grateful to one of my anonymous reviewers for highlighting this aspect of my thesis.
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